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DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Wallace Morgan appeals from the trial court's award of 
costs and attorney fees, the distribution and valuation of 
property, and the alimony award in his divorce. We reverse and 
remand for additional findings. 
Wallace and Vera Morgan were married in 1950. At the 
time of their marriage, Wallace was a dental student attending 
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. After he 
completed dental school in 1953, the couple moved back to Salt 
Lake City. In 1986, Vera filed a complaint for separate 
maintenance; Wallace filed an answer and counterclaim seeking a 
decree of divorce. The case was tried before the district 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1989) . 
court in December 1987, In April 1988/ the trial court granted 
Vera a divorce and made rulings on equitable property division 
and alimony/ and ordered Wallace to pay Vera's accounting, 
appraisal/ and attorney fees. Both parties prepared proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and post-trial hearings 
were held to discuss each side's objections. The trial court 
eventually accepted Vera's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Wallace raised several objections/ but final findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and a decree of divorce were 
entered on M^y 26, 1988. 
In the findings and conclusions, the trial court divided 
the marital assets and liabilities upon fair market value based 
primarily on the evidence presented by Vera. The court also 
ordered that the marital home be sold and the proceeds equally 
divided/ that Wallace pay Vera's legal/ accounting/ and 
appraisal fees, and that he pay her $2/000 per month in 
alimony, to be reduced to $1/700 per month two years after the 
date of entry of the decree. 
We address five issues: (1) the appropriateness of 
ordering Wallace to pay Vera's attorney fees and costs; (2) the 
appropriateness of valuing joint bank accounts as of a time 
prior to trial; (3) the sufficiency of findings to support the 
court*s award of alimony; (4) consideration of tax consequences 
incident to a sale of marital property; and (5) application of 
a minority discount factor when valuing Wallace's minority 
interests in partnerships. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
A. Costs 
Wallace first argues that the trial court erred in 
ordering him to pay Vera's costs, contending that they are not 
awardable by statute. The decree ordered him to pay accounting 
fees of $10,973.41 and appraisal fees of $920, both of which 
were incurred in preparation for trial. He also contends that 
$11,617.44 of Vera's $75,000 abtorney fees bill were improperly 
included costs.2 Vera argues that the appraisal, accounting, 
and attorney fees were not costs, but were instead marital 
obligations. She contends that the trial court awarded Wallace 
a greater percentage of the marital estate to cover payment of 
those expenses. 
2„ Wallace argues that the following charges are costs, not 
attorney £«*s: 
We review the trial court's award of costs under an abuse 
of discretion standard. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 
773_74 (Utah 1980); Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing. 
Ltd,, 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
M[C]osts are 'generally allowable only in the amounts and 
in the manner provided by statute,• but the [Utah] Supreme 
Court 'has taken the position that the trial court can exercise 
reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of costs; and 
that it has a duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in 
the taxing thereof.*- Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(Utah Ct. Apj>. 1987) (quoting Frampton, 605 P.2d at 773-74). 
Utah Rule of>Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) governs cost awards in 
civil litigation: 
Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or 
in these Rules, costs shall be allowed as 
of course to the prevailing party unless 
the court otherwise directs. . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined costs to mean Hthose 
fees which are required to be paid to the court and to 
witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be included 
in the judgment." • Frampton. 605 P.2d at 774. Thus, witness 
fees, travel expenses, and service of process expenses are 
chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule set by 
statute. l£l. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 21-2-4 (Supp. 
1989) (sheriffs fees); Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-8 (Supp. 1989) 
(witness fees in civil cases). Witness compensation in excess 
of the statutory schedule is generally inappropriate as a 
cost. Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. 
(footnote 2 continued) 
Appraisal fees: 
Copying costs: 
Depositions: 
Word processing: 
Courier services: 
Local travel: 
Service of process: 
Litigation support: 
Business meal: 
Misc. search 
TOTAL 
$4, 
$5< 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
,110.00 
,171.00 
938.96 
511.23 
495.00 
122.85 
211.40 
57.00 
23.29 
87.00 
$11,617.4 
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Furthermore, our appellate courts make a distinction 
between Mlegitimate and taxable 'costs' and other 'expenses, 
of litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not 
taxable as costs." Id. For instance, neither land surveys nor 
appraisal fees, incurred in preparation for litigation, are 
recoverable as costs. Stratford v. Wood, 11 Utah 2d 251, 253, 
358 P.2d 80, 81 (1961) (costs of survey made in preparation of 
trial not recoverable); Hatanaka, 738 P.2d at 1055 (survey); 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(cost of property appraisal). The appraisal and accounting 
fees here were incurred in preparation for trial and cannot be 
considered accost. The trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding these two items as costs. See Hatanaka, 738 P.2d at 
1055 • We also hold that it was inappropriate for the trial 
court to award $4,110 in appraisal fees which were included as 
part of the attorney fees award* 
Costs of depositions also are not recoverable unless "the 
trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good faith 
and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be 
essential for the development and presentation of the case." 
Fr amp ton, 605 P.2d at 774; Lloyd's Unlimited, 753 P.2d at 512, 
In Lloyd's Unlimited, we stated that the party seeking 
the cost of depositions bears the burden of proving that the 
depositions were reasonably necessary. Id. at 512. 
Depositions are reasonably necessary only where the complex 
nature of the case prevents a party from completing discovery 
through less expensive methods such as interrogatories, 
requests for admissions, and requests for the production of 
documents. Id. 
Vera argues that the two depositions, for which she seeks 
costs, were necessary "in order to verify that the information 
obtained [from Wallace] was correct.- In our review of the 
record, we cannot determine if the trial judge concluded that 
the deposition fees were reasonably necessary. In the findings 
and conclusions and decree, the deposition costs were simply 
awarded as part of the overall attorney fees, without 
consideration of their necessity.3 We therefore remand this 
w i n — " S a ^ ~ ? e y testi^ied that obtaining information from 
Uli 2 ™ V ? ! 4 d i f f l C U l t a n d necessitated the taking of at least 
ono deposition to -verify information. Tl.ere was no attempt 
O? th2 fee h o w e v e r ' t o ™>ke findings on the reasonableness 
4 
issue to the trial court to determine if the deposition costs 
were reasonably necessary- We also note that it was 
inappropriate for the trial court to award the costs of service 
of process in excess of that allowed by statute. Frampton, 605 
P.2d at 774, 
The remaining miscellaneous costs4 are not provided for 
by statute. These miscellaneous expenses, totalling $6,467.37, 
are not properly taxable as costs. See Frampton, 605 P.2d at 
774 (miscellaneous expenses of $395 for a contour model, 
photographs, and certified copies not taxable as costs). We 
therefore reverse the trial court#s award of these costs. 
B. Attorney Fees 
Wallace next argues that the trial court erred in 
ordering him to pay Vera's attorney fees because the fees were 
excessive and the court neither considered his ability to pay 
nor Vera's need for the award. A trial court has the authority 
to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings. Kerr v. Kerr, 
610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1336 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The decision to award fees 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, but must 
be based on evidence of financial need and reasonableness. 
Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986); Kerr, 610 P.2d at 
1384; Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1336. 
Reasonable attorneys fees are not measured 
by what an attorney actually bills, nor is 
the number of hours spent on the case 
determinative in computing fees, . . . [a] 
court may consider, among other factors, 
the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting 
the case, the reasonableness of the number 
of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services, the amount involved in 
the case and the result attained, and the 
expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved, 
Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1336 (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 
P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985)). 
4. Those costs include copying, word processing, courier 
services, local travel, litigation support, business meal, and 
miscellaneous search. 
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The decree simply orders Wallace to pay Vera's attorney 
fees in the amount of $75,000. The findings are deficient in 
that there is no mention that the trial court considered Vera's 
ability to pay her own fees or Wallace's ability to pay. See 
Kerr, 610 P.2d at 1384. The findings also fail to show the 
reasonableness of the requested fee. See Huck, 734 P.2d at 
419. Although Vera's attorney testified that such fees were 
reasonable in light of the difficulty of the case, there is no 
independent attempt by the court to characterize the fee as 
reasonable. See Kerr, 610 P.2d at 1384. Accordingly, we 
remand for reconsideration of the award of fees and for entry 
of such additional findings as may be necessary. 
VALUATION OF BANK ACCOUNTS 
Wallace next argues that the court erred by valuing six 
bank accounts prior to trial. He contends that the bank 
accounts were working accounts with fluctuating balances and 
that on the date of trial those balances were substantially 
lower than the balances listed on pre-trial bank statements 
produced by Vera.5 
The trial court should, in most circumstances, value the 
marital estate as of the time of the divorce decree. Beraer v. 
Beraer, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher. 
615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 
1050, 1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Vera argues that the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion in valuing the accounts 
by using two- to four-week-old bank statements. She contends 
that the bank statements were more accurate than Wallace's 
self-serving testimony. Finally, she asserts that Wallace's 
alleged obstructive and evasive behavior justified the court's 
pre-trial valuation. 
Without explanation, the trial judge apparently accepted 
the figures listed on Vera's exhibit even though Wallace 
testified that the accounts fluctuated daily and that the 
5. The bank accounts were valued as follows: 
Accounts Statements Wallace's Value 
Dental $16,642 $-1,641 
Tax $ 7,821 $ 3,173 
Farm $ 1,046 $- 314 
Bel Aire $ 8,667 $- 966 
Broadmore $ 6,559* $ -0-
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pre-trial statements were inaccurate. The findings fail to 
address the accuracy of the lower balances presented by 
Wallace. Furthermore, we find no evidence in the record 
suggesting that Wallace hid or drained assets between the date 
of the last bank statements and trial. See Peck, 738 P.2d at 
1052 (where one party hides or dissipates assets, the trial 
court may value property at a date earlier than trial). We 
note that the findings on this issue are neither "sufficiently 
detailed- nor -include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached.- Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting Ruqker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). 
We therefore remand for additional findings as to 
valuation of these accounts. 
ALIMONY 
We will not disturb the trial court's alimony award 
-absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion.- Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333. Wallace argues that 
the trial court erred by failing to make sufficient findings 
concerning Vera's financial condition and needs, her ability to 
live on the amount of money awarded in the decree, and his 
ability to make alimony payments. 
Alimony findings made by a trial court should consider 
three factors: (1) the financial condition and need of the 
party seeking alimony; (2) the seeking party's ability to 
produce a sufficient income for himself or herself; and (3) the 
ability of the other party to provide support. Jones v. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); English v. English, 565 P.2d 
411-12 (Utah 1977); see also Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 
(Utah 1986) (findings of fact must show that decree -follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence-). The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law here state that a 
-reasonable amount to be awarded to plaintiff as alimony is 
$2,000 per month for two years from the date of entry of the 
decree. Thereafter, alimony should be reduced to $1,700 per 
month.- In other findings relevant to alimony, the court 
stated that MDr. Morgan's current income from his dental 
practice is likely to decline as he reaches retirement age. 
The reduction in alimony provided herein is based upon the 
court's consideration of that decline . . . ." And, the court 
found that the marital assets awarded to Vera we.r? a factor in 
its alimony award, although the finding is unclear as to how 
the award of assets impacted the alim6ny award. 
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These findings are insufficient. See Johnson v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 696/ 699 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Marchant v. Marchant, 
743 P^2d 199/ 207 (Utah Ct. App- 1987). Although there is some 
evidence in the record concerning each of the parties' incomes 
and living expenses/ the court made no findings concerning 
Vera's -financial condition and needs/ her ability to provide 
sufficient income for these needs/ and [Wallace's] ability to 
provide support." Marchant, 743 P.2d at 207. We have 
previously stated the purpose of alimony: "to enable plaintiff 
to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her from becoming a 
public charge^" I&. It is obvious that consideration must be 
made of the npeds and abilities of both parties before an award 
of alimony is made* We remand this issue for adequate findings 
which support any award of alimony* 
TAX CONSEQUENCES 
Wallace next argues that the trial court failed to 
consider existing tax liability incurred when he sold his share 
of an investment partnership. He also alleges that the debt 
charged to him in the decree requires him to sell a large 
portion of his stocks, bonds, and other property and that the 
court should have considered the tax consequences of those 
future sales. 
We will not disturb a trial court's property division in 
a divorce case unless the court misunderstood or misapplied the 
law, the evidence presented on property values clearly 
preponderates against the findings, or the court's distribution 
results in such a serious inequity as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Furthermore, H[t]he weight and credibility of the 
witness, including expert testimony, and evaluations of 
property are matters to be determined by the trier of fact." 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983). When 
settling property matters, the trial court may decline to 
consider the speculative future effect of tax consequences 
associated with sale, transfer, or disbursement of marital 
property. Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 
1987) . 
The proceeds received from the investment sale were 
applied by Wallace to reduce a line of credit at Capital City 
Bank. In the decree, the trial court awarded Vera half of the 
investment sale proceeds without considering either tax 
consequences or the reduction of joint marital debt created 
when the proceeds were applied to reduce the line of credit. 
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According to testimony, a tax liability of approximately 
$23/000 was incurred as a result of the sale. There is no 
mention in the findings that the lower court considered this 
tax liability. If the tax liability was an accrued debt, and 
we have no way of determining that question without adequate 
findings, then the trial court should have reduced Vera's share 
of the proceeds by her proportionate share of the tax debt.6 
Futherraore, the trial court apparently failed to adjust 
the property distributions to account for the reduction in debt 
on the Capital City Bank line of credit, a joint marital 
obligation.^ While it is within the court's discretion to value 
and distribute property, we again, without findings, cannot 
determine if the court properly awarded the proceeds when the 
same proceeds were used to reduce a marital debt* 
We remand for additional findings on these issues and for 
consideration and findings on the tax liability and property 
award. In light of the remand for reconsideration of these 
issues, we have no way of determining if Wallace will be 
required to liquidate assets to pay marital debts. If the 
court determines that tax consequences are associated with the 
sale of property# it may consider those consequences/ but it 
has no obligation to "speculate about hypothetical future [tax] 
consequences.- See Alexander. 737 P.2d at 224. 
VALUATION OF MINORITY INTEREST 
Wallace next argues that the trial court should have 
valued the partnership interests by applying a minority 
discount factor. He disputes the court's valuation of three 
partnership interests and argues that the more accurate value 
is thirty-five percent less than the court's value. Vera 
concedes that while application of a minority discount is 
sometimes appropriate, it is inappropriate here. She also 
argues that two of the partnership agreements contain express 
provisions for cashing out withdrawing partners. She contends 
these provisions are controlling. Finally, she contends that a 
6. At a post-trial hearing, Vera argued that the tax reserve 
account was intended to cover the $23,000 tax debt. She 
therefore claimed that no reduction should be made from her 
share of the investment sale proceeds. However, there was no 
evidence in the record that the tax debt was paid from this 
account. 
880414-CA 9 
minority discount is only appropriate in those cases in which a 
sale of the partnership is imminent. 
"A minority discount is a reduction in the value of the 
stock of a party who has a minority interest in a closely held 
corporation on the theory that the party lacks the voting power 
to control decisions*- Hayes v. Haves, 756 P.2d 298, 299 n.7 
(Alaska 1988). The minority discount is applied on the premise 
that the owner of the minority interest has limited 
opportunities to sell and must often discount the sal€* price 
because of his minority position. See Reilina and Reilina. 66 
Or* App. 28**', D/3 P.2d at 1360, 1365 (1983); see also Lavene v. 
Lavene. 162 N.J. Super. 187, 392 A.2d 621, 623-24 (1978) 
(valuation of minority interest in close corporation is 
difficult "since a market wherein a willing buyer will meet a 
willing seller, neither under any compulsion, generally does 
not existH). At least one jurisdiction has held that 
application of a minority discount in valuing minority shares 
or interests should be applied as a matter of law* Haves, 756 
P.2d at 300. Other jurisdictions uphold a trial court's 
property valuation as long as it falls within the range of 
values established by the evidence. In re Marriage of Hoak, 
364 N.W.2d 185, 192-93 (Iowa 1985); see also Arneson v. 
Arneson. 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16, 22 (Ct. App. 1984); 
Bowen v. Bowen, 96 N.J. 36, 473 A.2d 73, 77 (1984); Reilina, 
673 P.2d at 1365; Belt and Belt, 65 Or. App. 606, 672 P.2d 
1205, 1207-08 (1983) modified on appeal 680 P.2d 390 (1984); In 
re Marriage of Jorcrensen, 180 Mont. 294, 590 P.2d 606, 610 
(1979). 
This court has addressed minority valuation on one prior 
occasion. See Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). In Weston, we concluded that the trial court's 
failure to apply the minority discount was not erroneous since 
the court's valuation of assets was -within the range of values 
established by all the testimony.- Id. The Weston court 
stated, however, that in some circumstances it may be 
appropriate to consider minority values, although it gave no 
examples of such circumstances. Id.7 
7. The Weston opinion points out that the remainder of the 
stock in the corporations was owned by family members, who were 
the most likely purchasers of the remaining stock. The 
guaranteed market for the purchase of the stock undoubtedly 
contributed co the trial court's refusal to apply the minority 
discount. 
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We review the trial court's partnership valuation, giving 
considerable discretion to its determination of property 
values. Arovle v. Arcrvle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984); 
Weston, 773 P.2d at 410- That valuation is given a presumption 
of validity which we will not overturn in the absence of a 
clear abuse of discretion. Weston, 773 P.2d at 410. When 
considering the expert's conflicting testimony on valuation, 
the trial court "is entitled to give conflicting opinions 
whatever weight [it] deems appropriate.- Id* (quoting Newmeyer 
v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)). For Wallace to 
challenge the trial courtfs valuation, he must present evidence 
on alternative methods of valuation. Aravle, 688 P.2d at 
470-71. 
Wallace owned minority interests in three partnerships: 
(1) Eckman-Midgley 25%; (2) Sunvest Limited 25%; and (3) Valley 
Land Partners #3 Limited 4.44%. The court valued his share of 
Eckman-Midgley at $309,214.75, Sunvest at $70,959, and Valley 
Land Partners at $7,360. Wallace does not contest these 
values, but simply argues that the court should have discounted 
the values by 35%, the minority discount figure presented by 
one of his experts.8 
A certified public accountant testified that a 35% 
minority discount is generally applied when considering the 
value of shares in a closely held corporation or the value of 
minority partnership interests in property:9 
Throughout my practice as a certified 
public accountant and a business 
evaluation expert, I repeatedly run into 
situations where minority investors find 
themselves sustaining significant 
discounts upon the liquidation of an asset 
when it is in the form of an investment; 
by that, I mean, if an investor owns 
minority shares of stock, they are 
typically not able to sell them in a 
closely-held company, at least at full 
market value as might be obtained from 
those who have majority control. 
8. Wallace argues that application of a minority discount of 
3S% reduces the value of the partnership interests by a total 
of $135,636. 
9. Wallace's expert testified that a minority'interest in a 
closely held corporation is similar to a minority interest in a 
partnership. 
880414-CA 
The same is true when they have 
minority interest in property. 
None of Vera's experts addressed the application of 
minority valuation. As such, the only evidence on value was 
presented by her accountant who apparently took the fair market 
value of the properties, figured Wallace's share of ownership 
interest, and subtracted his debt.10 
Based on the evidence before us, we are unable to 
determine how the courtfs judgment follows from the evidence. 
See Acton, 737 P.2d at 999. In its findings, the court 
accepted Vera s valuation without considering the 
appropriateness of applying the minority discount, even though 
Wallace presented undisputed minority discount evidence. 
Thus, the findings before us implicitly ignore the* 
undisputed minority discount testimony without stating any 
rationale for excluding the discount. The court is entitled to 
value the assets ••within the range of values established by all 
the testimony,- Weston, 773 P.2d at 410, but that 
determination, as expressed in its findings, must "be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.- Acton, 737 P.2d at 999 (quoting 
Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338). The findings are insufficient and 
we accordingly remand. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon remand, Wallace is not required to pay those costs 
which are neither properly taxable under rule 54(b) nor 
10. In some circumstances, valuation of partnership interests 
may be based on buy-out or dissolution provisions contained in 
the partnership agreement. Value based on that measurement, 
however, is not always the most accurate measure of the 
minority partnership's value. See Reilina, 673 P.2d at 1365 
(court rejects valuation method based on dissolution value of 
stock since it did not accurately reflect the value of the 
stock); In re Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39, 43-44 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1979) (court not restricted to various valuation methods 
provided in redemption agreement when none of the redemption 
provisions contemplated valuation in case of divorce); Bowen, 
473 A.2d at 78 (buy/sell agreement does not reflect the true 
value of the minority interest when the partner remains in the 
partnership). 
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11 wable by statute. The trial court should make additional 
f* dinqs on the reasonable necessity of the disputed deposition 
ints Additional and more detailed findings are necessary to 
d°termine Vera's financial need and the reasonableness of her 
requested attorney fees; the reason for valuing bank accounts 
before trial; the appropriateness of considering tax 
consequences associated with the sale of property; and the 
valuation of minority partnership interests within the range of 
values established by testimony. Finally, the trial court 
should consider the needs of each party and the ability to 
support themselves or to pay support before awarding alimony* 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
v^-
Norman H. Jackson^tfudge 
Johrkrarr Larson, Judge 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE ISSUE OF THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE SALE 
OF THE CALIFORNIA RESIDENCE WAS ADDRESSED AT 
TIME OF TRIAL. 
The respondent, Mr. Howell, has asserted that the tax issue 
raised in appellant's brief was not presented to the trial court 
and therefore, is barred on appeal. To the contrary, the issue 
and all relevant evidence was before the trial court. To begin 
with, Mrs. Howell did request the court to make a fair and 
equitable distribution of property (R. 8). Specifically, among 
other things, Mrs. Howell requested that she be awarded 
possession of the California residence (Tr. 215). One of the 
reasons why she requested possession of the California home was 
to avoid the tax consequences to her of the sale (R. 216). Ample 
and specific evidence with regard to the tax consequences of a 
potential sale of the California residence v/as presented to the 
trial court for its consideration, both by the testimony of Mrs. 
Howell and by that of Mrs. Howell's expert witness, Mark 
Papanikolas (Tr. 215 - 216 and Tr. 198 - 202). The failure of 
the court to consider this evidence rendered the property 
division inequitable. As a result, the issues were before the 
trial court, and are not barred on appeal. 
II 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY DOES NOT ATTEMPT 
TO EQUALIZE THE POST-DIVORCE LIVING STANDARDS 
OF THE PARTIES AND MUST BE REVERSED. 
Contrary to Mr. Howell's assertion that Mrs. Howell chose 
part time employment so that she could stay home with the 
parties' minor child, Mrs. Howell testified she was working part 
time because she could not find a full time job. (Tr. 229). In 
addition, plaintiff's assertion that the parties began 
experiencing dissatisfaction with their marriage in 1981 is 
totally irrelevant to any determination of the parties' standard 
of living or the award of alimony to Mrs. Howell. 
Instead, the relevant facts are that this was a marriage of 
long duration, and Mrs. Howell does not have sufficient training 
and skills to obtain employment at a level to meet her financial 
needs. At time of trial she was earning $645.00 per month, and 
the court found she is capable of only earning $7,500 per year, 
or $625 per month (R. 265). In contrast, Mr. Howell was earning 
$120,000 per year or $10,000 per month at time of trial (R. 265). 
Even so, the trial court only awarded Mrs. Howell alimony in the 
amount of $1,800 per month (R. 278 - 279). Clearly, she is 
unable to meet her monthly expenses of $5,000 per month, and 
clearly the award does nothing to equalize the post-divorce 
income of the parties. 
This was error as a matter of law because, as this Court has 
2 
recognized in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988): 
An alimony award should, to the extent 
possible, equalize the parties1 perspective 
post-divorce living standards and maintain 
them at a level as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. 
Id. at 1333. (Emphasis added). 
As a result, the lower court's award of alimony should be 
reversed, and a proper award entered based on the evidence in the 
record. 
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